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Abstract This article examines the pro-trade influence of immigrants using data on
state-level exports from the 48 contiguous USA to 28 countries during the year
1993. Immigrants from lesser developed countries are found to exert stronger
proportional effects on state-level exports relative to the immigrants from more
developed countries. Calculation of absolute immigrant effects at state, regional and
national levels also reveal influences of immigrants from developing countries are of
greater magnitude; however, results depend on the metric employed to categorize
countries as developing or developed. The findings emphasize the importance of
immigrants’ connections to business and social networks and allow for an improved
understanding of the role that information asymmetries play in fomenting
opportunities for immigrants to enhance trade.
Résumé Nous examinons l’influence pro-commerce des immigrés en utilisant des
données sur les exports au niveau national des 48 états contigus des États-Unis, à 28
pays pendant l’année 1993. On trouve que les immigrés des pays moins développés
exercent de plus forts effets proportionnels sur les exports au niveau national par
rapport aux immigrés des pays plus développés. Le calcul des effets-immigrés
absolus au niveau de l’état, de la région, et de la nation révèlent aussi que les
influences des immigrés des pays en voie de développement sont d’une plus grande
ampleur; les résultats dépendent pourtant de la métrique employée pour caractériser
les pays comme en voie de développement ou développés. Les conclusions
soulignent l’importance des liens des immigrés aux réseaux commerciaux et sociaux
et permettent une compréhension améliorée du rôle joué par des assymétries de
renseignment dans la création des occasions pour l’augmentation du commerce par
les immigrés.
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Introduction
In recent years, as the public debate surrounding the USA immigration policy has
becomemore heated and increasingly contentious, a growing literature has documented a
positive relationship between immigrants and host-home country trade flows. Although
numerous social ills, including job loss, crime, and a strain on social service provision are
cited as anticipated results of immigration, the trade-enhancing influences of immigrants
rarely, if ever, enter into discussions of immigration policy. Policy formulation would
benefit from an accurate accounting of all effects attributable to immigration. To that end,
we examine one facet of the immigrant–trade relationship: the influence of immigrants
onUS state-level exports andwhether variation exists in the state-level immigrant–export
link across home country development classifications. The findings provide for an
improved understanding of the importance of immigrant networks as a means by which
trade is facilitated and, in doing so, add to the relevant literature while also conferring
benefits to the immigration policy debate.
There are two channels throughwhich immigrants are thought to influenceUS exports
to their home countries. First, immigrants may arrive in the host country in possession of
information relating to home country markets that, if successfully exploited, reduces
transaction costs and thus may increase exports. Such information could range from
seemingly innocuous language skills to understanding the complexities of informal
contracting procedures and/or expectations of culture-specific business practices.
Second, exports may increase if immigrants maintain connections to business or social
networks that ameliorate search costs associated with the matching of buyers and sellers
or that act as a form of implicit insurance that fosters the completion of trade deals via a
reputation-maintenance effect. In both instances, immigrants’ network connections
would reduce the extent of asymmetric information and potentially facilitate exports.
Gould (1994), using US data, is the first to document a positive influence of
immigrants on home-host country trade. Although a detailed review of the related
research is beyond the scope of this paper, to provide an indication of the
voluminous literature that exists on the topic, we note that White (2007a, 2009) and
Mundra (2005) extend the work of Gould (1994) and report positive immigrant
influences on US trade. Similarly, pro-trade immigrant influences are reported for
many other home countries: White and Tadesse (2007) for Australia; Wagner et al.
(2002), Head and Ries (1998), and Helliwell (1997) for Canada; White (2007b) for
Denmark; Piperakis et al. (2003) for Greece; White and Tadesse (2009) for Italy;
Hong and Santhapparaj (2006) for Malaysia; Bryant and Law (2004) for New
Zealand; Blanes (2003, 2006) for Spain; and Girma and Yu (2002) for the UK.
Focusing on the role of networks, Combes et al. (2005) examine intra-France trade
and report a pro-trade influence of migrants. Similarly, Greenaway et al. (2007) and
Rauch and Trindade (2002) employ Chinese population shares to represent the
presence of ethnic Chinese networks and report that such networks increase bilateral
trade flows. Finally, Blanes (2005) and Blanes and Martín-Montaner (2006) for
Spain and White (2008) for the US report that immigrants exert positive influences
on intra-industry trade.
Several recent studies that examine the influence of immigrants on US state-level
exports emphasize the role of networks but fail to consider possible variation in the
trade-enhancing influences of immigrants across home countries (Tadesse and White
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2008; Dunlevy 2006; Herander and Saavedra 2005; Bardhan and Guhathakurta 2005).
Exceptions are Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) and Co et al. (2004). Using data on
exports from each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia to 29 countries for the
years 1989–1990 and 1999–2000, the authors find that ethnic networks are important
for only a subset of countries but are considerably greater in magnitude for this cohort
relative to effects reported in studies that assume identical immigrant–export effects for
all home countries. Several explanations are offered for the observed variation. For
example, cultural and institutional differences between host and home countries would
likely correspond with greater information asymmetries and afford opportunities for
immigrants to increase trade. Similarly, linguistic differences, at times used as a proxy
for cultural dissimilarity (Dunlevy 2006; Hutchinson 2002; Boisso and Ferrantino
1997), may impede the writing and enforcement of contracts and thus hinder the
initiation and completion of trade deals. Although these explanations are certainly
plausible, we consider the basis for the observed variation an open empirical question
and posit that lesser-developed countries are more likely than developed countries to
lack the institutions and/or formal channels that facilitate trade. Accordingly,
immigrants from such countries may face relatively greater opportunities to utilize
their network connections and, thus, to exert positive influences on exports.
Although findings presented in this paper are relevant to Bandyopadhyay et al.
(2008), in many aspects, the work is more closely linked to that of Co et al. (2004).
Employing data for state-level exports to 28 immigrant home countries during the
year 1993, Co et al. (2004) examine variation in the immigrant–export relationship by
stratifying their sample according to OECD membership and estimating identical
regression equations for the OECDmember and non-member samples. The authors then
construct confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients on the immigrant stock
variables. Because the confidence intervals are found to overlap, the authors conclude
that there is no difference between developed and developing home countries in terms of
the effects of immigrants on state-level exports. The use of sample stratification and
confidence intervals to discern variation in effects is problematic. While coefficients
from sub-group regressions represent group-specific effects, using confidence intervals
to compare immigrant effects assumes homoskedasticity in variances across the sub-
group regressions. Furthermore, although few would disagree that OECD membership
correlates with economic development, this metric leads Co et al. (2004) to classify
Hong Kong, Mexico, and South Korea as developing countries. As Mexico and South
Korea joined the OECD in 1994 and 1996, respectively, and the per capita income of
Hong Kong exceeds that of many OECD members, it is unlikely that these countries
are truly representative of the developing world.
Following Co et al. (2004), we use cross-sectional data for the year 1993;
however, we forgo sample stratification and instead pool our data and employ
interaction terms to identify variation in immigrants’ influences on state-level
exports across a range of home country development classifications. In doing so, we
rely upon a broader set of development classifications [OECD membership, UN
Human Development Index (HDI) classifications, and World Bank income
classifications] than did Co et al. (2004). Extending the related literature, we
illustrate that the homoskedasticity assumption implicitly invoked by Co et al.
(2004) is flawed and that there is, in fact, variation in the immigrant–export
relationship. As anticipated, we find that immigrants from lesser developed countries
Immigration, Trade and Home Country Development 123
exert stronger proportional effects on state-level exports relative to the effects of
immigrants from more developed countries. Additionally, calculation of absolute
immigrant effects at state, regional, and national levels suggests that the influence of
immigrants from developing countries is often of greater magnitude than the
absolute effects estimated for immigrants from developed countries; however, the
relative magnitudes of absolute effects depend on the metric employed to categorize
home countries as developing or developed. Taken collectively, the results
emphasize the importance of immigrants’ connections to business and/or social
networks and also allow for an improved understanding of the role that information
asymmetries play in fomenting opportunities for immigrants to enhance trade flows.
Empirical Specification
We begin our analysis by first replicating the estimation strategy of Co et al. (2004).
Using comparable data for the same 28 home countries and the same time period, we
examine the assumption of homoskedasticity in variances across regressions.1 We then
estimate an alternative specification to evaluate variation in proportional immigrant–
export effects across a number of home country development classifications. The
ordinary least squares technique is employed for both series of estimations. Finally, we
estimate average absolute immigrant–export effects at the state-level and consider the
existence of potential heterogeneity in effects across development classifications.2
Consistent with prior research, an augmented gravity specification is employed. The
equation employed by Co et al. (2004) is presented as Eq. 1.3
ln Xijtþ3 ¼ a0 þ b1 ln IMijt þ b2 ln Yjt þ b3 ln Yit þ b4 ln POPit þ b5 ln POPit
þb6 lnDISTij þ b7 lnOPENjt þ b8 ln PHONEjt þ b9ADJACENCY j
þb10NBORDERi þ b11SBORDERi þ b12WCOASTi þ b13ECOASTi þ "ijt
ð1Þ
Xijt+3 represents state i exports to country j during year t+3. The lag between
independent variables and exports follows Co et al. (2004), which notes that Gould
(1994) finds the effects of immigrants on trade begin roughly 3.8 years following
arrival. Yji represents home country gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of
economic mass, with higher values implying greater potential markets for domestic
goods. Similarly, gross state product (Yit) measures a state’s capacity to export. The
POP variables provide additional controls for home country and host state sizes. The
1 Appendix A lists the 28 countries included in the data set. Collectively, these countries accounted for
67.4% of US exports in 1993 (Feenstra, 1997) and were home countries for 60.2% of the 1990 US
foreign-born population (US Bureau of the Census 1993).
2 The effect of immigrants on net exports, while an interesting issue that is particularly important for
public policy, cannot be examined as import data is not available at the state level. Studies examining the
immigrant–trade link using aggregate trade data, however, provide mixed results as to whether
immigrants’ influences generate increases or decreases in net exports.
3 See Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Feenstra et al. (2001), Deardorff
(1998), Davis (1995), Bergstrand (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Anderson (1979) for
theoretical foundations.
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geodesic distance between each state and home country pair (DISTij) is a proxy for
transport costs. OPENjt, which is given as the sum of imports and exports divided by
GDP, is a measure of general propensity to trade and can be considered to represent a
country’s integration into the global economy. The number of home country landline
telephone connections per 1,000 residents (PHONEjt) reflects infrastructure development.
A series of dummy variables (ADJACENCYj, NBORDERi, SBORDERi, WCOASTi
and ECOASTi) capture potentially unique trading relationships between all states and
Canada and Mexico and relationships that may exist between border/coastal states and
all other trading partners.4
Results of estimating Eq. 1 for the full sample and for both OECD member and non-
OECD member sub-groups are presented in columns a–c of Table 1. Columns d–i
reproduce the results presented in Co et al. (2004). t tests evaluating differences in
coefficients on IMijt variables across regressions indicate equivalence across the sub-
groups. However, before drawing conclusions regarding differential effects from the
sub-group regressions, it is important to examine the assumption of homoskedasticity in
variances across regression estimations. F statistics corresponding to regression results
presented in columns b and c, e and f, and h and i are 3.85, 4.56, and 4.62, respectively.
Thus, in all cases, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity must be rejected.
While heteroskedasticity does not bias coefficients, it does bias standard errors and
creates problems regarding causal inference. Application of White’s heteroskedasticity-
corrected covariance matrix compensates for heteroskedasticity within regressions;
however, it does not correct for unequal variances across regressions. To address this
problem, we alter Eq. 1 to include a term that interacts the IMijt variable with a vector
of dummy variables, LDCj, which identifies countries as lesser developed.
Specifically, LDCj contains NON-OECDj, MEDIUM HDIj, UPPER MIDDLE
INCOMEj, LOWER MIDDLE INCOMEj, MIDDLE INCOMEj and LOW INCOMEj.
OECD membership and HDI classification, being dichotomous variables, are treated
as general development measures. The United Nations classifies countries as high
human development if 0.8<HDI, medium human development if 0.5<HDI<0.8, and
low human development if HDI<0.5. Of the 28 home countries included in the data,
none are classified by the United Nations as low human development. World Bank
classifications, based on per capita gross national income, provide an arguably more
detailed development measure. The Bank (1997) classifies countries as low income if
1995 GNI per capita<$765, lower middle income if $765<GNI per capita<$3,035,
upper middle income if $3,035<GNI per capita<$9,385, and high income if GNI per
capita>$9,385. Eq. 2 presents the general estimation equation.5
ln Xijtþ3 ¼ a0 þ b1 ln IMijt þ b2 ln IMijt  LDCj
 þ b3 ln Yjt þ b4 ln Yit
þb5 ln POPjt þ b6 ln POPit þ b7 lnDISTij þ b8 lnOPENjt
þb9 ln PHONEjt þ b10ADJACENCY j þ b11NBORDERi
þb12SBORDERi þ b13WCOASTi þ b14ECOASTi
þbLDCLDCj þ "ijt
ð2Þ
4 Appendix B lists data sources and discusses corresponding variable construction.
5 An F test, comparing adjusted R-squared values, indicates that in all cases estimation of Eq. 2 explains a
significantly larger share of the variation in exports than does estimation of Eq. 1.
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Equation 2 maintains the lag structure employed in Co et al. (2004). This is done
to allow for comparison of our estimation results to those of Co et al (2004) and to
avoid the potential problem of endogeneity.6 Interpretation of the coefficients on the
immigrant stock variables and the interaction terms is straightforward. Coefficients
on the IMijt variables, b^1, apply to both developed and developing countries, while
coefficients on LDCj dummy variables, b^LDC, indicate differences across develop-
ment classifications. As such, coefficients on interaction terms, b^2, represent
differences in slopes between developing country regression lines and developed
country regression lines. Thus, b^1 indicates the proportional change in the dependent
variable (i.e., state-level exports), applicable to developed home countries, expected
to result from a 1% increase in the number of immigrants from such countries. The
sum of the coefficients on the immigrant stock variable and the interaction term,
b^1 þ b^2, is thus the proportional change in state-level exports expected to result from
a 1% increase in the number of immigrants from developing countries. As is evident,
this approach simplifies testing whether immigrant–export effects differ across
development classifications as significant coefficients on interaction terms indicate
significant differences across developed and developing country classifications.
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics. Exports to OECD members, high HDI,
and high-income countries are greater than exports to non-OECD members, medium
HDI, and middle and lower income countries, respectively. Only lower middle income
countries have average immigrant stocks significantly different from the overall mean.
Developed countries are less open to trade as are lower middle income countries;
however, low-income countries are more open to trade than the average countries in
the sample. Regarding the infrastructure proxy variable, OECD countries, high HDI
countries, and high-income countries are significantly above the average level.
Developing countries generally have larger populations and smaller economies as do
medium HDI as compared to high HDI countries and lower income (low, lower
middle, and upper middle income) countries relative to high-income countries.
Estimation Results
Tables 4 and 5 present results obtained from the estimation of Eq. 2. Employing
OECD membership as an indication of relative development, variation in
immigrant–export links is reported in column a. Coefficient estimates for the
immigrant stock variable (IMijt) and the interaction term (IMijt×NON-OECDj) imply
that a 1% increase in the immigrant stock from an OECD country leads to an
estimated increase in state-level exports to the home country of 0.117%, while a like
increase in the immigrant stock from a non-OECD member country yields an 0.33%
increase in state-level exports. Since the coefficient on the interaction variable is
significant, we can say that, while immigrants from both sets of home countries are
found to exert positive and statistically significant influences on state-level exports,
the influence of immigrants from developing countries is of greater proportional
6 Results from estimation of ancillary regression specifications, where only the immigrant stock variable is
lagged, correspond to the conclusions presented in “Estimation Results”. All estimation results and data
are available upon request.
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magnitude relative to the corresponding influence of immigrants from developed
countries.
Before considering alternative development classifications, it is important to note
that the coefficients on the remaining variables in Tables 4 and 5 generally conform
to expectations. Higher transport costs, as represented by greater geodesic distances
between home countries and states, reduce state-level exports. Higher home country
GDP and higher GSP values correspond with greater exports. Thus, it appears that
larger economies import more from US states, and states that produce more output
Table 2 Descriptive statistics, full sample, and by OECD and UN HDI classifications
Variable/sample All countries Developed
(OECD
member)
Developing
(non-OECD)
High HDI Medium HDI
Exportsijt+3 211,131,284 447,356,072
a 99,235,332a 410,058,456a 82,413,703a
(832,714,761) (1,204,172,940) (545,176,862) (1,114,665,910) (544,976,083)
t stat – 3.80 3.86 3.71 4.34
Gross
Domestic Productjt
(in millions US$)
428,804.66 829,041.59a 239,218.75a 715,335.68a 243,402.24a
(596,491.73) (700,790.14) (424,540.56) (679,843.65) (447,037.69)
t stat – 10.69 8.82 8.49 8.21
Gross State
Productit (in millions
PPP$)
116,189 – – – –
(140,278.01) – – – –
Home Country
Populationjt
98,630,332 47,260,200a 122,963,553b 43,083,209a 134,572,588a
(252,786,629) (36,868,073) (302,846,558) (35,400,723) (318,114,512)
t stat – 7.22 2.00 7.86 2.74
Host State
Populationit
5,134,396 – – – –
(5,450,320) – – – –
Distanceij (in miles,
great circle method)
4,121.66 4,340.24b 4,018.12 4,851.78a 3,649.22a
(2,248.98) (1,504.76) (2,520.26) (1,775.06) (2,393.41)
t stat – 2.30 1.00 7.40 4.55
Immigrant Stockijt 9,685.15 8,333.78 10,325.27 8,134.35 10,688.61
(75,922.20) (19,123.53) (91,232.03) (19,859.18) (96,129.78)
t stat – 0.60 0.17 0.69 0.25
Opennessjt 0.6458 0.4959
a 0.7168a 0.6294 0.6564
(0.4142) (0.2256) (0.4617) (0.4838) (0.3621)
t stat – 9.57 3.73 0.68 0.62
Number of Landline
Phonesjt (per 1 k
residents)
182.73 409.11a 75.49a 403.79a 39.68a
(188.77) (94.31) (111.85) (91.11) (34.76)
t stat – 32.99 16.91 34.02 27.04
N 1,344 432 912 528 816
Mean values presented. Standard deviations in parentheses
a Statistical significance between sub-group values and the full sample at 1% level
b Statistical significance between sub-group values and the full sample at 5% level
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tend to export more. Countries that have relatively more developed infrastructure, as
represented by a higher number of phone connections per 1,000 residents, also tend
to import more from US states. Similarly, those home countries that are relatively
more open to trade tend to import more from US states. Coefficients on variables
Variable/specification (a) (b)
ln Immigrantsijt 0.117
b 0.141a
(0.054) (0.052)
ln Immigrantsijt× Non-OECD Memberj 0.213
a –
(0.054) –
ln Immigrantsijt× Medium HDIj – 0.221
a
– (0.057)
ln Gross Domestic Productjt 1.707
a 0.813a
(0.2) (0.197)
ln Gross State Productit 1.545
a 1.483a
(0.405) (0.411)
ln Home Country Populationjt −0.579a 0.282
(0.213) (0.212)
ln Host State Populationit −0.134 −0.077
(0.393) (0.401)
ln Distanceij −1.248a −0.902a
(0.123) (0.122)
ln Openjt 0.656
a 0.821a
(0.097) (0.106)
ln Phone Connectionsjt (per 1 k residents) 0.412
a 0.778a
(0.106) (0.135)
Adjacencyj −0.47b −0.026
(0.236) (0.224)
Border-Northi −0.196 −0.195
(0.128) (0.13)
Border-Southi −0.931a −0.974a
(0.191) (0.195)
Coastal-Westi 0.405
c 0.34
(0.242) (0.251)
Coastal-Easti 0.131 0.151
(0.098) (0.102)
Developing Home Countryj
(Non-OECD Member)
0.269 –
(0.391) –
Medium HDI Home Countryj – −0.372
– (0.465)
Constant −46.768a −42.072a
(4.797) (5.323)
Adjusted R2 0.7440 0.7336
N 1,344 1,344
Table 4 Estimation results
(dependent variable: ln
Exportsijt+3) OECD/non-OECD
and high/medium HDI home
country classifications
Dependent variable in all
specifications is ln Exportsijt+3.
Heteroskedastic consistent stan-
dard errors in parentheses
a Significance from zero at 1%
level
b Significance from zero at 5%
level
c Significance from zero at 10%
level
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Table 5 Estimation results (dependent variable: ln Exportsijt+3) World Bank Income Classifications
Variable/specification (c) (d)
ln Immigrantsijt 0.084 0.054
(0.057) (0.056)
ln Immigrantsijt×Middle Incomej 0.213
a –
(0.055) –
ln Immigrantsijt×Low Incomej 0.483
a 0.516a
(0.1) (0.099)
ln Immigrantsijt×Upper Middle Incomej – 0.311
a
– (0.084)
ln Immigrantsijt×Lower Middle Incomej – 0.199
a
– (0.06)
ln Gross Domestic Productjt 0.405
c 0.788a
(0.241) (0.274)
ln Gross State Productit 1.429
a 1.447a
(0.406) (0.394)
ln Home Country Populationjt 0.55
b 0.231
(0.235) (0.262)
ln Host State Populationit −0.045 −0.047
(0.396) (0.387)
ln Distanceij −0.784a −0.688a
(0.127) (0.13)
ln Openjt 0.828
a 0.959a
(0.122) (0.125)
ln Phone Connectionsjt (per 1 k residents) 0.201
c 0.524a
(0.12) (0.119)
Adjacencyj 0.567
b 0.938a
(0.222) (0.237)
Border-Northi −0.197 −0.196
(0.125) (0.124)
Border-Southi −0.979a −0.985a
(0.191) (0.189)
Coastal-Westi 0.298 0.279
(0.241) (0.239)
Coastal-Easti 0.151 0.169
c
(0.1) (0.099)
Middle Income Home Countryj −2.289a –
(0.458) –
Low Income Home Countryj −5.489a −3.722a
(0.776) (0.847)
Upper Middle Income Home Countryj – −2.632a
– (0.592)
Lower Middle Income Home Countryj – −0.591
– (0.588)
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representing home country and host state population levels, adjacency, borders, and
coasts produce mixed results across the estimations presented in columns a–d. While
this is likely the result of the inclusion of the various development classification dummy
variables, we note that the coefficients on the immigrant stock variables and interaction
terms are largely consistent across estimations in terms of sign and statistical
significance and interpret this as an indication of the robustness of our principle findings.
While OECD membership is a useful indicator of a country’s level of economic
development, we also consider additional indicators of development. We begin with
the estimation results presented in column b, where home countries are classified as
being either at high or medium stages of human development based on the UN HDI.
Similar to our previous specification, the dummy variable that identifies the lesser
developed country cohort (LDCj)—in this case, MEDIUM HDIj—is interacted with
the immigrant stock variable (IMijt). We find that a 1% increase in the immigrant stock
from a medium HDI country yields an estimated 0.362% increase in state-level
exports. A similar increase in the immigrant stock from a high HDI country increases
exports by only 0.141%. As with the results obtained when classifying countries by
OECD membership, the immigrant–export effect is positive and significant for both
classifications. Given the high correlation (0.86) between classification as high HDI
and OECD membership, these results are expected. Effectively, using medium HDI
instead of non-OECD membership to identify developing countries reclassifies Hong
Kong and South Korea as developed countries. Since the coefficient on the interaction
term is significant, the results further support the existence of variation in immigrant–
export effects across home country development classifications.
To provide a more in-depth examination of heterogeneity in immigrant–export
effects, we employ World Bank income classifications to categorize the countries in
our sample. Column c presents results when home countries are classified as high,
middle, or low income. The coefficient on the immigrant stock variable is positive but
insignificant. This suggests that immigrants from high-income countries typically do
not exert discernable influences on state-level exports. For middle and low-income
countries, however, we do find positive and significant immigrant–export effects.
More specifically, in response to an assumed 1% increase in a state’s immigrant stock
from the typical middle-income country, state-level exports to the respective home
Table 5 (continued)
Variable/specification (c) (d)
Constant −31.837a −39.588a
(4.959) (4.97)
Adjusted R2 0.7518 0.7568
N 1,344 1,344
Dependent variable in all specifications is ln Exportsijt+3. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in
parentheses
a Significance from zero at 1% level
b Significance from zero at 5% level
c Significance from zero at 10% level
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country are estimated to increase by 0.297%. A similar increase in the immigrant stock
from the typical low-income country increases exports by 0.567%. We consider this to
be compelling support for our notion that the opportunities available to immigrants, in
terms of utilizing their connections to business and social networks as a means to
overcome information asymmetries and, hence, to facilitate trade, are relatively more
abundant for immigrants from lesser developed countries and significantly less
prevalent for immigrants from developed countries.
Modifying the specification such that the middle-income classification is further
decomposed into upper middle and lower middle income groupings permits a more
detailed examination of the immigrant–export relationship. Corresponding estimation
results are presented in column d. As in the previous regression (column c), the
coefficient on the immigrant stock variable is positive but insignificant, again
suggesting that immigrants from high-income countries exert no discernable effects
on state-level exports. In response to an assumed 1% increase in the number of
immigrants from a low-income country, state-level exports are estimated to increase by
0.57%. As one would expect for these two development classifications, the results are
nearly identical to those reported in column c. The decomposition of the middle-
income classification into upper middle and lower middle income groupings, however,
reveals further variation in immigrant–export effects. Assume that 1% increases in the
number of immigrants from upper middle and lower middle income countries are
estimated to generate increases in state-level exports of 0.365% and 0.253%,
respectively. The larger proportional immigrant–export effect for the upper middle
income classification relative to the lower middle income classification may seem at
odds with our hypothesis that a lack of development corresponds with greater
information asymmetries and, thus, increased opportunities for immigrants to facilitate
trade. However, given that the upper middle income classification consists of Greece,
Mexico, Portugal, South Korea, and Trinidad and Tobago, it may well be that the
inclusion of Mexico and/or South Korea is responsible for the larger coefficient estimate.
Results obtained when estimating each of the four regression specifications
indicate that immigrants from lesser developed countries exert positive and
significant influences on state-level exports. We also find that the magnitude of
proportional immigrant–export effects is inversely related to the general level of
development and that, in two of the four estimations, no significant immigrant–
export effect is found for the most developed countries. This is consistent with the
notion that immigrants from lesser developed countries face greater opportunities to
exploit their connections to business and/or social networks as a means of
overcoming trade-related information asymmetries. However, it is also important
to note that, while the results presented in this study may indicate general findings or
tendencies regarding the presence and relative magnitudes of immigrant–export
effects, as is stated in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008), networks may also be very
important for state-level exports to developed countries, and the lack of statistical
significance should be interpreted as an indication of no measurable immigrant–
export effects rather than as confirmation that no immigrant–export effect exists.
While we have identified variation in proportional immigrant–export effects
across the home country development classifications, immigrant stock and export
levels also differ across states and regions. Thus, variation in absolute effects may
also exist. Table 6 presents estimates of the average marginal effects of additional
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immigrants. These estimates are generated, at the state, region, and national levels,
using coefficients presented in Tables 4 and 5 and state-level immigrant stock and
export data. Regional and national mean values, for each home country
classification, are derived as arithmetic means of the corresponding estimates of
state-level immigrant effects. Estimates of state-level immigrant–export effects are
arithmetic averages of values calculated across relevant state-home country pairs as
E ΔXijtþ3
  ¼ ðb^1  Xijtþ3Þ=IMijt for developed countries and for developing
countries as E ΔXijtþ3
  ¼ ðb^1 þ b^2Þ  Xijtþ3
h i
=IMijt.
t tests of differences in mean values are calculated to determine whether average
estimated immigrant–export effects vary across the home country development
classifications. For example, the mean values (with significance noted) for the state
of Connecticut, which are listed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, are 8,206 and
16,950 for the developed and developing country cohorts, respectively. The
corresponding t test for a difference in mean values indicates that these values are
statistically different when evaluated at the 10% level of significance. Similarly,
for the state of Maryland, columns 7–9 report values of 2,576, 653, and 814,
respectively, for the upper middle, lower middle and low-income country cohorts.
Testing for difference in mean values, again employing a t test, reveals that the
value presented for the upper middle income classification is higher than that of the
lower middle and low-income classifications at the 1% and 5% levels of
significance, respectively. However, the value presented for the lower middle
income classification is not significantly different from the value presented for the
low-income classification.
At the national level, we see significant variation in immigrant–export effects.
Values presented in columns 1 and 2 indicate that the average export effect of
immigrants from non-OECD (developing) countries ($13,636) is significantly more
than the effect attributable to immigrants from developed countries ($10,517).
Variation in effects, also at the national level, is reported in columns 3 and 4.
However, in this case, immigrants from high HDI (developed) countries have a larger
estimated average effect on exports ($13,310) than do immigrants from developing
countries ($7,105). That immigrants from developing countries are estimated to
contribute relatively more to state-level exports when employing coefficients from
specification (a) and to contribute relatively less when coefficients from specification
(b) underscores the difficulty in employing dichotomous development classifications.
Allowing for more detailed classification of home countries by relative level of
development, columns 5 and 6 illustrate that, while no immigrant–export effect is
found for high-income (developed) country immigrants, positive yet statistically
similar average effects are found to result from immigrants from middle ($8,784) and
low-income ($8,615) home countries. Segmenting the middle-income home country
classification into upper middle and lower middle income classifications, columns 7–9
indicates variation in effects across development classifications. On average,
immigrants from upper middle income home countries increase state-level exports
by $14,814, while immigrants from lower middle and low-income home countries
increase exports by an average of $7,572 and $9,203, respectively. The remainder of
Table 6 indicates that, when comparing across regions and states and considering the
more-detailed classification of countries, greater variation in effects is found to exist.
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Discussion of Results and Concluding Thoughts
The results of the econometric analysis indicate clear and statistically significant
differences, across a series of home country development classifications, in both the
proportional and the absolute effects of immigrants on US state-level exports. This
corrects the finding reported in Co et al. (2004) of there being no significant
difference in the immigrant–export relationship across development classifications.
Additionally, the results emphasize the importance of how development is measured.
While OECD membership may be a useful measure of relative development, the
associated dichotomous characterization is less than ideal when one attempts to
discern between group-specific effects. Use of HDI classifications as an alternative
measure yields similar results and, unfortunately, suffers the same shortcoming.
World Bank income classifications are more detailed and, thus, permit more in-depth
examination; however, it is important to bear in mind that, while average income is
correlated with non-monetary measures of development, it too is an imperfect
metric. Regardless of the shortcomings of each development classification scheme,
the consistency of results across all three development classifications and the four
estimation equations suggests that variation in immigrant–export effects does indeed
exist.
A separate finding is that immigrants from developing countries typically
increase state-level exports to their respective home countries proportionally more
so than do immigrants from relatively developed countries. As immigrant
populations and trade patterns vary across states and regions, estimates of the
absolute effects of an additional immigrant are generated. Again, significant
variation is reported across geographic locales, with the average immigrant from a
developing country found to exert a greater absolute influence on state-level
exports when OECD membership and World Bank income classifications are used
to categorize countries as developing or developed. The average immigrant from a
developed country is found to exert a greater absolute influence on state-level
exports when countries are classified as developing or developed based on the UN
Human Development Index.
As mentioned at the outset, lesser developed countries may be characterized,
relative to developed countries, as more likely lacking in terms of having
established, well-functioning institutions and/or formal channels that serve to
facilitate trade deals. The results presented in this paper support the notion that
immigrants from developing countries may face relatively greater opportunities to
utilize their connections to business or social networks as a means by which trade-
related information asymmetries may be ameliorated. The importance of creating
and implementing an optimal immigration policy, in terms of quelling public
discontent and garnering the greatest possible gains from immigration, requires an
accurate accounting of all effects of immigrants on their host countries. The findings
reported in this paper inform policy on an issue that is of particular public interest;
however, given the importance of immigration as a public policy issue and as the
analysis is undertaken using a limited number of immigrant source countries and a
single year of data, this should be considered a first step of sorts in the sense that
further research, using a larger data sample and a broader array of specifications, is
merited.
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Appendix A: Country Listing/Development Classifications
Canadaa,b,c, Chinaf, Colombiae, Dominican Republice, Ecuadore, El Salvadore,
Francea,b,c, Germanya,b,c, Greecea,b,d, Guatemalae, Guyanaf, Hondurasf, Hong Kongb,
c, Indiaf, Irelanda,b,c, Italya,b,c, Jamaicae, Japana,b,c, Mexicod, Nicaraguae, Panamae,
Perue, Philippinesf, Portugala,b,d, South Koreab,d, Thailande, Trinidad and Tobagod,
United Kingdoma,b,c.
a OECD members; b High HDI countries; c High-Income countries; d Upper
Middle Income countries; e Lower Middle Income countries; f Low-Income
countries.
Appendix B: Data Sources
State-level export data are from Feenstra (1997). Immigrant stock values are from
the US Bureau of the Census (1993). Gross state product data are from the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.doc.gov). Home country populations and
GDP and trade values, used to construct the openness variable, are from the World
Bank (2003). The infrastructure proxy variable and gross national income per capita,
used to classify countries as high, upper middle, lower middle and low income, are
from the World Bank (2003). State population values are from the US Bureau of the
Census (1996). Distance between state and home country capitols are calculated by
the author using the Great Circle method. OECD membership is from the OECD
(www.oecd.org). Human Development Index classifications are from the United
Nations Development Programme (2004). Adjacency is a dummy variable equal to
one if the home country is Mexico or Canada; zero otherwise. Border-North and
Border-South equal one if the host state borders Canada or Mexico, respectively;
zero otherwise. Similarly, Coastal-West and Coastal East equal one if the host state
borders the Pacific Ocean or either the Gulf of Mexico or Atlantic Ocean,
respectively; zero otherwise.
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